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Abstract: Starting from the observation that surplus-value is almost always due to the collective 
undertaking of non additively separable human capital investments, this paper introduces a theory 
of the institutional structure of production where groups are taken as units of analysis in a multi-
level competition framework that conceptualizes a mutually-determining co-evolution between 
individuals and institutions. The main result is that monopoly profit is not the only meaningful 
notion of profit besides the value of individual contribution, and consequently that free-entry and 
competition do not necessarily wipe it out. The intuition behind the ‘purest’ case where the 
incumbent’s profit does not arise from his uniqueness but only from the production process, is that 
the entrant has no incentives to undercut because he can earn the same profit by doing exactly the 
same thing. 
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In the lecture delivered on receiving his Nobel Prize, Coase (1992) 
summarized his fundamental contribution to microeconomic theory as having 
shifted the focus of analysis from the exchange of physical entities such as 
commodities to the exchange of legal entities such as rights. In regard to 
industrial organization, in particular, this shift amounted to moving from price 
and quantity determination to explanation of the institutional structure of 
production, globally meant as comprising the competitive structure of markets 
and the firms’ organizational structure, or the division of labor between firms 
and the division of labor within them.   
To the extent that Coase’s insight is exhausted in the simple extension 
to production of the logic of Pareto-efficient exchange among given 
individuals, however, this paper will argue that the entire project is, at best, 
incomplete.  
Not surprisingly, the starting point of the analysis is the notion of ‘team 
production’, or non additively separable production functions. By definition, 
indeed, a non additively separable production function means that productive 
factors collectively transform themselves in the production process. In turn, 
this transformation of productive factors, rather than the substitution between 
them, may be taken as the distinguishing feature of production with respect to 
exchange, casting doubts on the view of economic phenomena as collections of 
distinct individual contributions and shifting the focus of the analysis from the 
allocation of scarce resources to the creation of a surplus. In other words – as 
long ago anticipated by Marx and, before him, by so-called ‘utopian socialists’ 
– cooperation in teams implies that the total product is larger or better than the 
sum of separable outputs from each cooperating individual, but ‘[t]here is no 
longer anything which we can call the natural reward of individual labour. 
Each labourer produces only some part of a whole, and each part, having no 
value or utility in itself, there is nothing on which the labourer can seize, and 
say: It is my product; this I will keep to myself’ (Hodgskin, 1825, p. 85; quoted 
in Marx, 1867, p.355).
1  
Given that the idea is not new, the theoretical contribution made by this 
paper is its application of the notion of non additive separability to the concept 
of human capital investment, the aim being – as anticipated in the title – to 
expand its standard treatment to account for the feedback effect of the 
institutional structure of production on ‘the productive capacities of human 
beings as income producing agents in the economy’ (Rosen, 1987, p.681).  
                                                 
1 In effect, Marx devoted an entire chapter of Capital to cooperation as a determinant of the 
production of surplus-value and as a distinctive feature of capitalism with respect to the 
previous modes of production (the thirteen). This observation prompted the perception of the 
difference between the division of labor carried out by the market and the division of labor 
carried out within the firm, leading to anticipation of many of the issues of the modern theory 
of the firm (see Pagano, 2007). The labor theory of value as an objective theory of value 
providing physically comparable measures of value, however, persuaded Marx that ‘natural’ 
prices, reflecting the amount of resources used in the production process, could be decoupled 
from market prices, with the consequent exaggerated policy implication of abolishing markets. 
See also footnotes 12 and 18.   2
Accordingly, production processes will be classified depending on 
whether the team feature applies both ex ante and ex post, ex ante but not ex 
post, ex post but not ex ante, or neither ex ante nor ex post. Recalling the 
definition of investment as the current employment of resources to increase 
future production, the terms ex ante and the ex post refer to the periods before 
and after the decisions taken become operative, and, to facilitate an abstract 
representation of working life as consisting of these two periods, throughout 
the paper they will also be called ‘preparation’ and ‘realization’.  
On the basis of this classification it will become clear that the logic of 
Pareto-efficient exchange among given individuals is best suited to analysis of 
only one case out of the possible four: namely the rather special one where the 
production process requires investments which are separable both ex ante and 
ex post. Indeed, when a production function is additively separable, that is, 
when it can be written as a sum of single-variable component functions, the 
maximization of such component functions is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the maximization of the whole function. And, as will be seen, 
since it is easy to interpret this case as implying that individual optimization 
coincides with collective optimization, this is also the only case where the 
institutional structure of production (perfect competition among individual 
producers) can be interpreted in terms of the optimal incentive condition 
involving a perfect alignment between individual contributions and individual 
rewards, both deriving from specialization according to comparative 
advantage.  
In the other three cases, however, the separate maximization of the 
component functions is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the 
maximization of the whole function. Rather, as also shown by the equivalent 
notion of strategic complementarity, there are gains to be made from the joint 
determination of the variables which appear in the whole function. 
Consequently, the possibility of using Pareto-efficiency as a positive principle 
requires, as a necessary condition, the assumption of no wealth effects, which 
re-establishes the logical equivalence between individual and collective 
optimization.  
But, although not particularly unrealistic for firms’ relationships, this 
assumption covers the element of collective transformation mentioned above, 
and with it, the related issues of power and conflict, respectively meant as the 
capacity to impose one’s will on others and as a situation where one’s gains are 
the other’s loss. Not by chance, in their famous solution to the problem of 
nature of the firm, obtained by adding the assumption of opportunism to that 
originally introduced by Coase (1937), and by consequently defining team 
production in terms of costly metering, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) attribute 
to the entrepreneur precisely the function of separating individual 
contributions, so as to make it possible to resume the familiar conceptual   3
framework of the gains from trade deriving from specialization according to 
comparative advantage (see also Barzel, 1987). And, again not by chance, this 
is the reason why in what follows both such assumptions are discarded, 
transaction costs are mainly understood as coordination costs rather than 
incentives costs, and the role of free-riding and other forms of cheating are 
played down in favor of the issue of whether the solution to the coordination 
problem raised by strategic complementarities is symmetric or asymmetric – a 
perspective which, moreover, is not entirely inconsistent with the Coase 
theorem itself.
2  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
introduces the approach proposed, showing that monopoly profit is not the only 
possible notion of profit besides the value of individual contribution, and that 
consequently free-entry and competition do not necessarily wipe it out. More 
specifically, the results on the institutional structure of production associated 
with the three cases involving collective investments are set out in the form of 
propositions in sub-section 2.1., and discussed in their relation to the case of 
independent production, as well as to the opposite approaches of new-
institutional economics and the Marxist literature, in sub-section 2.2. Section 3 
provides past and present applications of the proposed reasoning, together with 
some possible extensions. Section 4 briefly concludes. 
 
2. Individuals and institutional rules between methodological 
individualism and structural holism 
 
Reversing the order followed in the Introduction, this section initially 
abstracts from the case of independent production, postponing its full 
discussion to sub-section 2.2.  
The reasoning is as follows (fig. 1). When surplus-value is created by 
the collective undertaking of non additively separable human capital 
investments – an apparently ubiquitous situation since otherwise we would not 
observe such extremely costly organizations as firms – it is reasonable to think 
of the economy as if it were inhabited by a population of groups, each of them 
consisting of the individuals who belong to it, of the relationships among them 
(intra-group relationships), and of the relationships between them and the other 
groups (inter-group relationships).  
                                                 
2 As well known, because of the distance from the original meaning that Coase gave to 
transaction costs, he has always been rather skeptical about the role of opportunism as a way to 
‘operationalize’ his own ‘fundamental insight’ (see, for example, Coase, 2000; see also 
Matthews, 1986, Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, and Taylor 1976). As to the Coase theorem 
(Coase, 1960), then, even the assumption of no wealth effects may end up by having to be 
interpreted as its sister assumption of no transaction costs: not a simplification which does not 
entail generality losses, but a way to illuminate its role.    4
Using an approach intermediate between the methodologically 
individualistic approach of new-institutional economics and the structural 
holistic approach of orthodox Marxism  – that is, seeking not to explain 
institutions in terms of the interaction between given individuals or individual 
behaviors in terms of given institutions – the paper takes groups as the units of 
analysis in a multi-level competition framework where between-group 
competition and within-group competition are assumed to operate sequentially 
in logical time and respectively determine inter-group relationships and intra-
group relationships.  
More precisely, exogenous technological conditions (i.e., the above 
type of investments) determine the nature of inter-group relationships, these 
being defined as the institutional rules that govern the process by which groups 
form, interact with each other, and become extinct. By providing the conditions 
under which a participation constraint from boundedly rational individuals – 
the organizational counterpart of a technological feasibility constraint – is 
satisfied at minimum cost, inter-group relationships will be shown to be 
determined according to the group-value maximizing pressure of between-
group competition. In other words, groups that fail to conform to the right type 
of inter-group relationship do not minimize technological and organizational 
costs, or they do not even make the right investments, and are therefore 
assumed to disappear (see Alchian, 1950). In particular, following the timing 
structure attributed to the investment process, the three types of inter-group 
relationships considered in the paper will be called conflictual, fission-fusion 
with commitment, and fission-fusion without commitment, where these terms 
respectively mean that groups form, interact with each other, and become 
extinct through mutual assimilation or absorption (as if they were never 
ceasing to exist as groups), through a two-period, rule-based association of 
single individuals, or through a one-period, unregulated association of single 
individuals.
3 
Such inter-group relationships, in their turn, perform a twofold role. On 
the one hand, because they are the rules whereby groups interact, they amount 
to a given surplus-value realization process: that is, the market’s competitive 
structure through which surplus-value is realized and becomes profit. 
Accordingly, the three cases initially analyzed, and corresponding to the three 
types of inter-group relationships just mentioned, will be respectively called a 
between-group competition push (as when surplus-value is realized as profit 
deriving from oligopolistic price competition), a between-group opportunity 
pull (as when surplus-value is realized as profit arising from monopolistically 
                                                 
3I adapt this terminology from the evolutionary group selection models in biology, 
anthropology and economics (see, respectively, Sober and Wilson, 1998, Einrich, 2004, and 
Bowles, 2004, ch. 13).      5
competitive product differentiation), and a within-group competition push (as 
when surplus-value is realized as profit arising from a perfectly competitive 
squeezing of the other group members’ shares of the surplus).
4 
On the other hand, because inter-group relationships are the rules 
whereby groups become extinct, they determine who the (next generation) 
intra-group decision-makers are, that is, the structure of property rights on the 
relevant assets and skills, and the associated system of shared distributional 
beliefs ensuring that they are self-enforcing.
5  
The decision-maker’s value-maximizing pressure of within-group 
competition, then, determines intra-group relationships, these being defined as 
the institutional rules governing the division of labor and the distribution of the 
surplus within the group. To put it another way, given the outside options of 
the other group members, decision-makers manage the production process so 
as to maximize their share of the surplus (see Veherencamp, 1983).  
Such intra-group relationships, finally, will be distinguished according 
to two basic features. The first is whether they are hierarchical or egalitarian, 
both in the organizational sense of how decisions are taken (by authority or by 
consensus), and in the distributional sense of how surplus is distributed (by 
appropriating or sharing).The second is whether they are decentralized or 
centralized, in the sense of whether or not recruitment occurs in the presence of 
equally attractive outside options.  
In sum, the more the institutional structure of production is akin to what 
Schumpeter called ‘pure’ capitalism, meant as consisting solely of private 
property, competition and division of labor, the more it is likely that a sharp 
distinction between decision-makers and subordinates obtains. Because the 
assumption of no wealth effects has been dropped, the value of the group will 
not be maximized in the game, so to speak, within the group, so that total value 
(or the value of the super-group) will not be maximized either. For the time 
being, this focus on the possibility that, especially as far as employer-employee 
relationships are concerned, there exist Pareto-efficient allocations that do no 
maximize total value may be taken as the main motivation for the assumption 
about the sequential operation of the multi-level selection process, echoing the 
                                                 
4 I take the terms ‘competition push’ and ‘opportunity pull’ from Ghiselin (1995). In more 
familiar terminology, they correspond, respectively, to a movement along and a movement 
toward the Pareto-frontier. See also Calabresi (1991). 
5 The role of (cultural) beliefs in representing institutional elements exogenous to every 
individual whose behavior they influence, but at the same time endogenous to all of them when 
it comes to their equilibrium reproduction, has been pointed out by Aoki (2001; 2007), Greif 
(1994, 2006), and Hodgson (1998; 2006). A more detailed, but still informal, treatment of the 
process of beliefs’ formation and updating in the present framework is conducted at the end of 
section 3.  The specific types of (distributional) beliefs associated with the various structures of 
property rights are made explicit in the next sub-sections.   6
famous opening sentence of Marx’s Critique of Political Economy.
6 At the end 
of section 3, however, where the paper outlines the possibility that those 
Pareto-efficient allocations that do not maximize total value are contested, it 
will be argued that the underlying attempt to conceptualize the co-evolutionary 
nature of the interaction between individuals and institutions may be 
rationalized as a more general consequence of the difference between social 






                                                 
6 As the definition of groups given above makes clear, relinquishing state of nature 
abstractions with isolated individuals does not mean attributing causal force to higher order 
entities independently from the individuals who belong to them. In this sense, an even better 
quotation can be taken from the German Ideology, where Marx urges us to consider 
individuals ‘(..) in the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find 
already existing and those produced by their activity’ (Marx, 1845, p. 7). But, of course, since 
this evolutionary interpretation of Marx’s method may not be entirely convincing from the 
point of view of the history of economic though, like the other recurrent references to his 
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conditions   7
2.1. The institutional structure of collective production and the dual 
nature of profit 
 
Equipped with the above methodological and terminological material, 
we are now in a position to state and demonstrate the propositions concerning 
the three cases involving cooperative production. Before doing so, however, it 
is useful to specify the timing structure and simplify the relation between price 
and quantity. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: individuals live in only the two periods necessary for the 
investment process, the ex ante period (t=0) and the ex post period (t=1), but 
they leave their property (assets and skills) to their (one for each) offspring. 
 
To fix ideas, it may be useful to think of only two pairs of individuals 
per generation ( 1 − = T  and  0 = T ), randomly drawn from the entire 
population. Note also that parents enter the problem only to satisfy the 
individual participation constraint ensuring that investments are made. Quite 
similarly to what evolutionary game theory assumes, and in effect representing 
the technical solution to the problem giving the paper its title, parents are 
assumed to be only myopically rational. The subsequent decrease in the 
uncertainty faced by actors across generations, captured by the evolution of the 
shared system of distributional beliefs, is thus rationalized as an effect of the 
complexity-reduction function usually attributed to institutions.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: production is assumed to consist in producing a single item.  
 
Unlike the previous one, this is a simplifying assumption which does 
not entail generality losses. For the same results would be obtained if the 
quantity produced were equal to the one minimizing organizational and 
technological costs, an outcome usually associated with price-taking and which 
is perfectly consistent with the present framework. Moreover, the assumption 
also highlights the fact that there is no necessary relation between non-
separability and the nature of returns to scale. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: when the best investments are non-separable either ex ante 
or ex post, inter-group relationships are conflictual, the surplus-value 
realization process is a between-group competition push, and intra-group 
relationships are hierarchical and centralized (fig.2, box to the upper left; see 
also fig. 3, same box).  
 
When the most productive investments create a surplus both ex ante and ex 
post, they can never profitably stay independently on the market; rather, as a   8
consequence of technological and organizational non-separability, they must 
be undertaken collectively in both the preparation and realization periods (with 
the introduction of a new machine and on-the-job training, for example). 
Accordingly, since groups must be in place at   0 = t  and last until 1 = t , the 
group-value-maximizing pressure of between-group competition implies that 
cost-minimizing groups emerge from conflictual inter-group relationships. 
Consequently, the surplus-value realization process is a  between-group 
competition push, whilst intra-group relationships are hierarchical and 
centralized. On the one hand, the equilibrium price is equal to the higher of the 
two investment costs. On the other hand, the decision makers are the offspring 
of the winners of the previous conflict, and the pressure of within-group 
competition drives them to take control of the entire investment process, 
appropriating the entire surplus. With hierarchical beliefs implying that any 
arrangement satisfying a constraint in terms of participants’ market value will 
be accepted, subordinates are left with what they can get from totally 
independent participation in the production process (subsistence wages, to 
anticipate the literal application in the next section). Recruitment, finally, is 
centralized because it does not occur in the presence of equally attractive 




PROPOSITION 2: when the best investments are non-separable ex ante but 
are separable ex post, and the (net) value of a truncated investment of this kind 
is lower than the (net) value of the available investments separable both ex ante 
and ex post, inter-group relationships are fission-fusion with commitment, the 
surplus-value realization process is a between-group opportunity pull, and 
intra-group relationships are egalitarian and decentralized. Otherwise, 
proposition 3 below applies (fig.2, box in the middle; see also fig.3, same box). 
 
When the most productive investments create a surplus ex ante but not ex post, 
they must be undertaken collectively in the preparation period but can be 
realized independently – as, for instance, with collective specialization in a 
new professional field like, say, class action. In this case, indeed, groups must 
be in place at  0 = t  but not necessarily at  1 = t  since in the absence of the team 
                                                 
7 I use the term ‘coercion’ to denote a situation where subordinates have no equally attractive 
outside options and cannot undertake any of the investments by themselves, although of course 
physical violence is not implied (subordinates are paid what they can earn from independent 
participation in the production process). A fortiori, this is true of the situation where 
subordinates have equally attractive outside options but cannot begin or realize the investment 
independently (propositions 2 and 3), where I use the term ‘force’. As will be seen at the end 
of the next sub-section, however, they are both an instance of power as defined in the 
Introduction. See also the quotation from Mokyr (2002) in section 3.    9
production feature, technological and organizational costs are minimized with 
self-organizing producers. Hence, if the above condition holds, the group-
value-maximizing pressure of between-group competition implies that the most 
successful groups emerge from fission-fusion with commitment inter-group 
relationships.  
The surplus value realization process therefore consists of a between-group 
opportunity pull, while intra-group relationships are egalitarian and 
decentralized. On the one hand, following the convention of representing the 
benefit of product differentiation with a reduction in transportation costs, the 
equilibrium price is equal to the cost of the other investment. On the other 
hand, because  the commitment prevents would-be dominant individuals from 
appropriating the entire surplus by realizing the investment independently (as 
exemplified by the non-compete clauses commonly used in partnerships, to 
anticipate an application in the next section), property rights and the associated 
system of shared distributional beliefs are such that nobody is provided ex ante 
with the assets and the skills for autonomous participation in the production 
process, so that the decision-maker is the whole group. The investment process 
is therefore regulated by consensual decision making, while the joint surplus is 
shared according to inter-subjectively defined rules (as a consequence of 
egalitarian beliefs implying that only arrangements where the constraint is 
articulated in terms of the market value of the joint product will be accepted).
8 
Finally, in this case, recruitment is decentralized in the sense that previous 
groups disband into their constituent parts and the new ones are formed by 
single individuals ‘choosing’ among equally attractive outside options.  
 
PROPOSITION 3: when the best investments are separable ex ante but not ex 
post, and the (net) value of a truncated investment of this kind is higher than 
the (net) value of the available investments separable both ex ante and ex post, 
inter-group relationships are fission-fusion without commitment, the surplus 
value realization process is a within-group competition push, and intra-group 
                                                 
8 From a normative point of view,  the already cited Hodgskin (1825, p.83) puts the matter in 
the following terms when describing the rules of just distribution in his ideal society: ’There is 
no principle or rule, as far as I know, for dividing the produce of joint labour among the 
different individuals who concur in production, but the judgment of the individuals 
themselves; that judgment depending on the value men may set on different species of labour 
can never be known, nor can any rule be given for its application by any single person.’. 
Shortly afterwards, Hodgskin singles out the conditions under which market-based distribution 
would be acceptable:’If all kinds of labour were perfectly free, (…), there would no difficulty 
on this point, and the wages of individual labour would be justly settled by what Dr. Smith 
calls the “haggling of the market.”.’ (ibid., pp. 85-86, emphasis added). In this sense, Marx’s 
harsh critique of ‘utopian socialists’ as unscientific –that is, lacking the precision of the natural 
sciences- may have been decisively influenced by the positivist climate of his times, though of 
course it also true that their economics was rudimentary at best.    10
relationships are hierarchical and decentralized. Otherwise, proposition 2 
applies (fig.2, box to the lower right; see also fig.3, same box).  
 
When the most productive investments create a surplus ex post but not ex ante, 
they can be undertaken independently in the preparation period but must be 
realized collectively – as, for instance, when a given product is designed and 
assembled. 
If the above condition holds (as it may in the case of subsidized middle-level 
education or immigration, for example), since groups must only be in place at 
1 = t , the pressure of between-group competition implies that the most 
successful groups arise from fission-fusion without commitment inter-group 
relationships.  
Since investments are not to be realized with specific counterparties, they 
cannot be much better or very different from each other, so that they will be 
basically the same (as must be the case with outsourcing, to anticipate the two 
applications in the next section). Hence in this case the process of surplus-
value realization amounts to a within-group competition push,  while intra-
group relationships are hierarchical and decentralized. On the one hand, the 
equilibrium price is equal to the cost of the next best type of investment (as in 
the following case of totally independent production, the point here is that 
there is no strategic interaction between groups, so that there is nothing to gain 
from lowering prices). On the other hand, decision-makers are (the offspring 
of) previously successful surplus-takers and the pressure of within-group 
competition drives them to dominate realization of the investments, this time 
appropriating the surplus created at this stage. With the same hierarchical 
beliefs of Proposition 1, in effect, subordinates have no reason to expect better 
terms elsewhere, but they cannot realize the investment independently and are 
consequently forced to accept being paid the value of their truncated 
investment. Finally, in this case too, recruitment is decentralized because new 
groups are formed by individuals coming from the independent investments 




                                                 
9 Of course, the most probable situation is one where subordinates are in excess supply, so that 
also market power enters the picture. Remarkably, however, the situation is theoretically 
consistent with free-entry and full employment (after which the condition given in the text 
becomes meaningless, prompting a change in the resulting inter-group relationships and the 
associated surplus-value realization process). This point is especially relevant to the analytical 
Marxist approach which, dropping the labor theory of value and working in a market 
imperfections framework, tends to view power solely as a consequence of workers being on 
the short side of the market (see Bowles and Gintis, 2008).   11
If, conversely, the above condition does not hold (as in the case of costly 
elitarian education or  a sufficiently high ‘basic income grant’, for example), 
the pressure of between-group competition implies that the most successful 
groups arise from fission-fusion with commitment inter-group relationships, so 
that Proposition 2 applies (the only difference being that they form at t=1 with 
the commitment implicitly covering t=0, instead of being formed at t=0 with 
the commitment explicitly covering t=1).  
 
                                                  Intra-group relationships 
Inter-group relationships 
                                                (1)                              (2)                          (3) 
                                      Hierarchical and        Egalitarian and      Hierarchical,    
                                      centralized                 decentralized         decentralized, or     
                                                                                                       case (2)                    
                                                                                                      
(1)                             
Conflictual       non-separable either ex ante and ex post       
                              between-group competition push 
 
(2)                                    
Fission-fusion with                 non-separable ex ante, separable ex post   
commitment                                  between-group opportunity pull             
                                                                 
        (3)                                                                                             
Fission-fusion without                                separable ex ante, non-separable ex post  
Commitment,  or case (2)                                    within-group competition push  
                                                                                                           




The conclusion to be drawn from this section, of course, is not that free-
entry and competition do not eliminate monopoly profit. The point is instead 
that, even if there are neither rents nor collusion, there is still another sort of 
profit which arises from realizing the surplus-value created by the collective 
undertaking of non-additively separable human capital investments, and it is 
measured by the difference between the cost of such investments and the cost 
of the next best investments (the equilibrium price or opportunity cost). Rather 
than being eliminated by competition, therefore, it is this other sort of profit 
that determines the competitive structure of markets as the way in which 
surplus-value is realized.     12
Accordingly, such a result can be understood as a consequence of 
moving from a ‘neo-classical’ perspective basically deriving from the logic of 
exchange (where surplus-value can only arise from some form of scarcity, 
competition is an exogenous condition, and prices reflect the technical rate of 
substitution between productive factors) to a somewhat more ‘classical’ 
perspective (also) based on production (where surplus-value arises from the 
team feature, competition is an endogenous process, and prices reflect the cost 
of transforming productive factors).  
Indeed, the intuition behind the ‘purest’ case where the incumbent’s 
profit does not arise from his uniqueness, but only from the production process 
(Proposition 3, first part), is that the entrant has no incentive to undercut 
because he can earn the same profit by doing exactly the same thing.
10 Finally, 
as also anticipated in the Introduction, although the fact that economic agents 
can create value even if they do the same thing may seem somewhat 
encouraging, this other sort of profit must be characterized as having a dual or 
ambivalent nature because, while essentially originating from cooperation, it is 
likely to create conflict on the terms of both its production and its distribution.  
The next sub-section illustrates how the proposed framework can be 
adapted to account for two other popular notions of profit: the value of   
individual contribution, and the profit arising from collective monopoly over 
the means of production. For both the associated explanations of the 
institutional structure of production, respectively, the new institutional 
approach and the orthodox Marxist approach, it will be shown that a special 
case is mistaken for a general case owing to a considerable degree of 
methodological inflexibility.  
The analysis, however, begins with what can be presented as an 
institutional understanding of a general competitive equilibrium. 
 
2.2. Discussion: the role of groups in institutional analysis 
 
Contrast the above results with the fourth possible case, the one in 
which the most productive investments are separable both ex ante and ex post. 
Clearly, in this case no surplus is created by cooperation, no collective 
transformation of productive factors takes place, and investments must be 
undertaken independently both in the preparation and realization periods (as in 
traditional agriculture or craftsmanship, for example). It is therefore obvious 
that groups never form and that inter-group relationships collapse into intra-
group relationships.  
                                                 
10 In the mixed cases of Propositions 1 and 2, instead, that part of profit which arises from 
strategic interaction with competitors is to be understood as a quasi-rent.   13
Consequently, since immediate and impersonal spot market intra-group 
relationships satisfy the participation constraint at minimum cost, the surplus-
value realization process is a within-group opportunity pull (surplus-value is 
realized as profit deriving from a competitive evaluation of individual 
contribution, in its turn created by specialization according to comparative 
advantage.). On the one hand, the intuition being the same as in Proposition 3, 
first part, equilibrium prices are again equal to the cost of the next best type of 
investment. On the other hand, as also suggested by the quotation from 
Hodgskin (1825) in footnote 8, in this case distributional beliefs are such that 
only arrangements articulated in terms of the market value of individual 
products will be accepted. Accordingly, as anticipated in the Introduction, such 
a perfectly competitive institutional structure of (individual) production can be 
fully rationalized in terms of the optimal incentive condition requiring the full 
appropriation of individuals’ own efforts. Notably, however, even in this case, 
competition does not eliminate profit but is instead determined as a way to 
realize surplus-value.    
Of course, the situation is unfortunately (and possibly unfairly) 
consistent with some individuals appropriating all the gains from trade, that is, 
with unequal exchange. But to the extent that this kind of investment creates a 
surplus-value with respect to autarchy, every individual has the appropriate 
incentive to make it. In sum, as importantly shown by the Fundamental 
Welfare Theorems, distribution has no impact on efficiency; and as equally 
importantly implied by Samuelson’s (1957, p. 894) statement that in general 
competitive equilibrium ‘it does not really matter who hires whom’, neither 
power nor conflict is involved.
11 
This is not the case when surplus-value is created by the collective 
undertaking of non-additively separable human capital investments. Depending 
on the nature of inter-group relationships, that is, on the market’s competitive 
structure and the consequent structure of property rights, there may be a 
tension between the group-value-maximizing pressure of between-group 
competition and the decision-maker-value-maximizing pressure of within-
group competition. When this is the case – that is, the group is sharply divided 
between decision-makers and subordinates as in the already mentioned 
Schumpeterian vision of ‘pure’ capitalism – the investment process is managed 
(in toto or in part) to maximize the former’s share of the surplus, and the latter 
are left with what they can get from independent participation in the production 
process (implying technological and organizational inefficiency as well as 
                                                 
11 To put it another way, in Marx’s terminology, market power may arise as a consequence of 
past circumstances in the sphere of circulation, but independence in the sphere of production 
means that the logic of an exchange economy successfully applies to production, and 
distribution policies can only be justified in fairness terms (see Rowthorn, 1974).   14
exploitation: proposition 1 and proposition 3, first part).
12 When this is not the 
case – that is, when commitments delineate a sort of ‘regulated capitalism’, so 
that the decision-maker can be roughly identified with the whole group – the 
investment process is managed to maximize the joint surplus and individual 
shares are determined according to inter-subjectively defined sharing rules 
(possibly implying efficiency and egalitarianism, without exchange among 
individuals: proposition 2 and proposition 3, second part).
13  
In no case can the institutional structure of production be explained in 
terms of an efficient alignment between individual contributions and individual 
rewards, as in the new-institutional literature’s stretching of the logic of 
exchange. As mentioned, the result may be understood as deriving as much 
from the dropping of the assumption of no wealth effects as from the dropping 
of the behavioral assumption of generalized opportunism.  
Indeed, while the assumption of no wealth effect is necessary to re-
establish the logical equivalence between Pareto-efficiency and value 
maximization, it is not sufficient to cast the problem as a conflict between 
individual and collective rationality and, consequently, to conceive its solution 
– the firm – as a way to internalize the externalities generated by the existence 
of transaction costs or contractual incompleteness, bringing the surplus value 
realization process back under the comfortable blanket of a within-group 
                                                 
12 The notion of exploitation referred to in the text has already been introduced in another 
paper (Battistini, 2007) and can be now confirmed by noting that wage is price and, as such, is 
equal to the opportunity cost of the investments. In some sense, then, this could be interpreted 
as an attempt to update the labor theory of value by substituting the physical quantity of 
socially necessary labor time with the value of independent participation in the production 
process, exploitation being precisely the reason why reality may seem in contradiction with the 
abstract representation of working life as consisting of the two periods of preparation and 
realization. Making similar considerations about cooperation as a determinant of surplus-value, 
Elster (1982, p. 225) quotes the first part of the following, well-known passage: “Now, in my 
presentation, the earnings on capital are not in fact “only a deduction or ‘robbery’ of the 
worker”. On the contrary, I present the capitalist as a necessary functionary of capitalistic 
production, and show at length that he does not only “deduct” or “rob” but forces the 
production of surplus- value, and thus helps create what is deduct; I further indicate in detail 
that even if in commodity exchange only equivalents are exchanged, the capitalist –as soon as 
he has paid the labourer the real value of his labour-power- quite rightfully, i.e. by the right 
corresponding to his mode of production, obtains surplus-value.” (Marx, 1977, p. 382). See 
also Pagano and Rowthorn (1994).   
13 Interestingly, in this case the attractive features of exchange in the sphere of circulation 
(mutual benefits, no power, and no conflict) may be available at the level of the groups. 
Unfortunately, however, since this is not very likely to occur spontaneously, as a consequence 
of inserting groups as an intermediate layer of analysis between individuals and society, rather 
than more and more competition, what may be required is its suppression within the group. 
The reason is that, as it happened with health and education policies in the so-called Golden 
Age of capitalism, for example, in the present context it is the empowerment of ordinary 
people that creates value. See footnote 19.   15
opportunity pull. This is in effect the role performed by generalized 
opportunism, both in the asymmetric information literature pioneered by 
Alchian and Demsezt’s 1972 paper, where the emergence of a centralized 
monitor reverses the market-based relationships between individual 
contributions and individual rewards, and in the specificity-based literature, 
where property solves the incentive-depressing lack of coincidence between 
individual contributions and individual rewards due to the hold-up problem 
(see Williamson, 1985, for transaction cost economics, and Hart, 1995, for the 
incomplete contracts approach). In the first case, as shown by the famous 
grocery example, this logic leads to the conclusion of denying the very 
existence of power, since, as happens with perfect competition, exit is free. In 
the second case, this quite extreme conclusion is at least avoided because, by 
definition, with specific investments exit is instead generally costly. However, 
perhaps because the analysis is mainly focused on vertical integration, the 
same logic implies, somewhat paradoxically, that the exercise of power is 
Pareto-improving.  
A less obvious consequence of the assumption of no wealth effects is 
that groups can be treated like individuals, so that compatibility with the 
perfect competition model, whose existence and properties are usually 
assumed, explicitly or otherwise, from the outset, is assured. Ex ante, this   
general competitive equilibrium ‘state of nature’ with given individuals is the 
tool necessary to evaluate comparative advantages and guarantee that property 
rights flow to those able to make the most efficient use of them. Ex post, 
supposedly by eliminating monopoly profits, competition guarantees that the 
ensuing power positions are not abused. Hence the famous statement that 
‘Economics has gained the title Queen of Social Sciences by choosing solved 
political problems as its domain’ (Lerner, 1972, p. 259) is confirmed, whilst 
the equally famous metaphor of a competitive economy composed of ‘islands 
of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious cooperation’ (Robertson, 
1923, p. 85) is borne out.   
However, to the extent that the commitment to methodological 
individualism does not allow one to go beyond the conceptual framework of 
the gains from trade deriving from specialization according to comparative 
advantage (actually, a sequence of within-group opportunity pulls), one may 
argue that is no coincidence that, while neo-classical economics does not have 
a theory of the firm, new-institutional economics does not have a theory of 
markets, leaving the Coasean project unfinished.   
On the other hand, however, the same type of criticism can be made of 
the opposite, structural holistic approach taken by the orthodox Marxist theory 
of the firm (see especially Marglin, 1974). Because of the commitment to the 
concept of class, indeed, in this case it is individuals that can be treated as 
groups, so that inter-group relationships again collapse into intra-group   16
relationships. Hence the only differences are that intra-group relationships now 
refer to the super-group comprising the two groups (classes) of  (industrial) 
workers and (industrial) capitalists, and that their exploitation-driven, 
hierarchical character – the firm – implements a surplus-value realization 
process which is inevitably a within-group competition push. Here, realism is 
at risk because, without the labor theory of value, profit can only arise from  
assuming that capitalists collude to enforce their collective monopoly over the 
means of production, for example engaging in a sort of ‘conspiracy’ to prevent 
their more ‘enlightened’ fellows from introducing more egalitarian and 
possibly more efficient forms of organization of production.
14  
The identification of the sort of profit discussed at the end of the 
previous sub-section instead allows the conclusion to be drawn that, under 
certain conditions, there exists a group or class conflict which is in the interest 
of each as well of all the individuals involved, so that no collusion is necessary. 
In other words, since in this case, as with Marx’s original labor theory of value, 
it is competition, rather than the lack of it, which determines class behavior, the 
latter may have to be understood not so much as a conscious will to oppress but 
as a consequence of a ‘real’ structure which is only partially under the control 
of the economic actors (and, of course, of which markets are a ‘mere’, if 
ineliminable, manifestation).
15 
In its turn, however, the existence of this kind of conflict also makes it 
clear that, to be exercised, power does not need the exit from a given 
relationships to be costly or even impossible, thus casting doubts on the liberal 
distinction between the economy as the ‘province of will’ and the polity as the 
province of ‘coercion’ (see, for instance, Acemoglou, 2003). 
 
3. Applications and extensions 
 
This section uses some stylized facts about firms and markets to 
illustrate past and present applications of the propositions stated in sub-section 
2.1 (fig.3).  
Firstly, the box to the upper left pertains to oligopolistic competition 
between hierarchical firms, the best example being the ‘classical’ firm.  The 
main feature of the industrial revolution, in effect, was the rise of the factory, 
that is, the grouping of previously separate branches of trade under one roof. In 
the terms used here, this means that investments were non-separable either ex 
ante or ex post, so that they could not profitably stay independently on the 
                                                 
14 Owing to the role played by the micro-foundations of institutions, instead, in the cases of 
proposition 1 and 3, first part, the reason why more efficient (and more egalitarian) groups do 
not emerge is simply that they are more costly.  
15 See Wright (1996) for the ontological difference between the uses of the word ‘class’ as a 
noun or an adjective.   17
market either at preparation or at realization. As a consequence, inter-group 
relationships were conflictual and the surplus-value realization process was a 
between-group competition push (as shown by the early obsession with 
increasing the volume of production and lowering prices in order to 
appropriate market share from competitors). As for intra-group relationships, 
works by Ure (1835), Babbage (1832) and Braverman (1974) leave little doubt 
that they were hierarchical (both in the organizational sense that investments 
were intended to diminish the skill content of workers’ jobs, and in the 
distributional sense that wages were fixed at subsistence), and centralized (in 
the sense that recruitment occurred without meaningful outside options from 
the outset).  
  Whilst a non-literal interpretation of the previous case can be extended 
to contemporary high volume, low-price mature industries (especially in 
developing countries where market mechanisms are more pristine), the box in 
the middle instead represents the case of oligopolistic competition between 
cooperative firms like, for instance, partnerships (see Rayan and Zingales, 
1998, and Levin and Tadelis, 2005, for efficiency-based explanations). As a 
consequence of investments which must be undertaken collectively at the 
beginning but can be realized independently, inter-group relationships are 
fission-fusion with commitment (up-or-out promotion rules, non-compete 
clauses). In turn, the latter can be seen as implying a surplus-value realization 
process consisting in a between-group opportunity pull.
16 Flat hierarchies and 
profit sharing, then, are obvious examples of egalitarian intra-group 
relationships, while their decentralized character is due to the relative mobility 
of professionals’ ‘labor markets’. 
Finally, the box to the lower right corresponds to perfect competition 
between between flexible firms such as those of the ‘putting-out system’. Since 
this consists of the assembly of separate parts of the product, investments can 
stay independently in the market at preparation but not at realization. To the 
extent that this system was the first step in pushing independent crafts out of 
the market, the surplus-value realization process was a within-group 
competition push (the piece-rate wage system being an example of 
subordinates left with the value of a truncated investment), in turn generated by 
fission-fusion without commitment inter-group relationships (there was no 
point in having stable groups, and workers typically could sell their produce to 
multiple ‘putter-outers’). Intra-group relationships, on the other hand, were 
hierarchical also in the organizational sense, and they were decentralized, as 
evidenced by this quotation from Marglin (1974, p. 81): ‘The minute 
                                                 
16 After their detailed analysis of the specialization of lawyers in law firms, Garricano and 
Hubbard (2003) conclude that ‘Lawyers are more likely to work at the same firm with lawyers 
in their own field than with lawyers from any other field’ (p.30).    18
specialization that was the hallmark of the putting-out system only wiped out 
one of two aspects of workers’ control of production: control over the product. 
Control of the work process, when and how much the worker would exert 
himself, remained with the worker until the coming of the factory’.   
Closer to our times, another example is, for want of a better term, the 
contemporary ‘global’ firm.
17 As in the putting-out system, investments can be 
undertaken independently in the preparation period but must be realized 
collectively (as implied by the fact that even relatively simple products are the 
result of a myriad of small components made in different plants often located 
in different parts of the world). To the extent that the condition given in 
proposition 3 holds, inter-group relationships are fission-fusion without 
commitment and the surplus-value realization process is a within-group 
competition push (as especially demonstrated by private equity firms). On the 
other hand, intra-group relationships are hierarchical both in the organizational 
sense (as shown by the new forms of separation between conception and 
execution embodied in the growing indifference as to where production 
actually takes place) and in the distributional sense (as confirmed by the 25-
year long increase in the earning gap between skilled and unskilled labor). 
Finally, the super-mobility imposed on relatively unskilled manual or 
intellectual workers means that they, too, are decentralized.  
 
                                                 
17 Of course, the phenomenon is not confined to multinational firms but is part of the general 
trend toward sub-contracting and flexibility driven by information technology and the 
increasing importance of immaterial goods.    19
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FIG. 3 
Though somewhat ineliminable, the imperfect match between the 
taxonomic approach of section 2 and the underlying evolutionary paths just 
outlined can be improved by tackling the problem of institutional change. On 
the one hand, indeed, the industrial revolution and the advent of information 
technology have both been such large-scale pushes that the shift from the 
putting-out system to the classical firm, and that from Keynesian Taylorism to 
the contemporary ‘global’ firm, can be easily accommodated. Indeed, they 
strengthen the paper’s evolutionary characterization because, as the following 
quotation inspiringly summarizes, in the real world, Pareto-efficient allocations 
that maximize total value not only exist, but may also change: “For the 
economist, it is a logical puzzle why, in the absence of coercion, workers 
would voluntarily agree to work in factories if doing so reduced their utility. 
Many workers were paid a factory or a coal-mine premium as a compensating 
differential, and workers were provided with benefits such as housing, 
schooling for their children, and even milch cows (…). Insofar as this was 
inadequate, however, factory owners, especially in the countryside, relied on 
pauper children and orphans ‘borrowed’ from workhouses. Beyond that, 
however, the economic logic of the Industrial Revolution implied that workers 
might end up working in factories even if it made them worse off than they 
were before (though not worse off than if they stayed at home). The reason is 
that opportunity cost of many of these potential factory employees was set by   20
what they could earn in the cottage industry. This alternative declined rapidly 
because of factory competition and by 1850 was, in most cases, no longer 
available. The factories, by relentlessly driving down the price of manufactured 
goods, reduced the earnings of those working at home and thus forced them (or 
their offspring) to abandon their cottages and seek work in the mills or to 
emigrate” (Mokyr, 2002, p. 128, emphasis added; see also Piccione and 
Rubinstein, 2007).
18  
But, on the other hand, other complex determinants, such as 
ideologically and scientifically driven institutional changes, have played a 
comparable role in other cases (the unions and the role of the state in the post 
World War II shift toward the Western welfare states, for example). Because 
knowledge is not only technical but also economic, these latter considerations 
highlight the main theoretical deficiency of the framework proposed: namely, 
the feedback effect of the institutional structures on their supporting systems of 
shared distributional beliefs.  
The complexity of the problem suggests that it should be left to future 
research, but the reason why it should be investigated is obvious. In the 
language of the game-theoretic approaches to institutions (Aoki, 2001; Bowles, 
2004; Greif, 2005; Young, 1998), inter-group relationships are the equilibrium 
of the (previous generation) game between groups, and at the same time they 
determine the rules of the game within the group (players, strategies, and pay-
offs) and the associated system of shared distributional beliefs. Intra-group 
relationships, instead, are the equilibrium of the (present generation) game 
within the group. But, whilst in this paper the rules of the game between 
groups have been taken to be determined by technological and organizational 
conditions alone, one can also speculate that intra-group relationships, 
                                                 
18A promising link with the economic-evolutionary literature can therefore be established by 
extending the analysis to long-run growth, which in the present framework should be 
conceptualized as the economy-wide, rapid shift from one type of investment to the other, in 
analogy with the biological concept of ‘punctuated equilibria’ (Eldredge and Gould, 1972). 
Though the periodization is more closely related to that proposed by Maddison (1982) and, 
more generally, by the long wave literature (Freeman and Louça, 2001), the logical sequence 
of the paper’s argument is quite strikingly similar to that embodied in the notion of ‘techno-
economic paradigm’, introduced by Perez (2002) and also containing a detailed analysis of 
capital markets. The identification of another sort of profit in addition to monopoly profit, on 
the other hand, has two obvious consequences for the neo-classical theory of growth: for one 
thing, capital accumulation turns out to be a consequence of growth rather than its engine (see 
Roemer, 1990, for a contrary view); for another, since innovation is not the only such engine 
either, the indulgence on profit and, consequently, on inequality,  as a necessary condition for 
growth loses much of its appeal, independently of any internalization-of–externalities 
argument (see, for example, Galor and Moav, 2004). Note, finally, that since updating of the 
labor theory of value as mentioned in footnote 12 means diluting the distinction between 
constant and variable capital into the more encompassing concept of human capital, no 
tendency to a falling rate of profit is implied.   21
depending on whether or not they maximize group value, may have the effect 
of either confirming or disrupting the shared beliefs motivating the equilibrium 
play, thus either confirming or inducing a change in the rules of the (next 
generation) game between groups (with only the former being, so to speak, a 
multi-level  equilibrium of the super-game comprising the two, doubly 
recursive games played between- and within-groups).  
As anticipated in section 2, in methodological terms, such a 
development can be justified as a consequence of the difference between the 
social and the natural sciences. Given that the former, but not the latter, are 
concerned with observer-relative phenomena, special attention must be paid to 
the deontological process through which human institutions are collectively 
recognized and accepted (Searle, 1990; 2005; see also North, 2005 and Gintis, 
2007). At the cost of restricting the analysis to economic institutions, in this 
respect the point to be made should be that this process may be captured by the 
evolution of shared system of distributional beliefs, in its turn driven by the 
value-maximization processes implied by the sequential operation of the multi-
level selection process. As outlined in the discussion of Hypothesis 1 in sub-
section 2.1., in other words, the idea is that players are assumed initially to 
know neither the game nor the super-game; then they know the game but not 
the super-game; and finally they know both the game and the super-game but 
may have conflicting views; in which case institutional change is triggered.
19  
Differently from the classical game theoretic approach, where players 
are assumed to know everything of interest from the beginning, but – now – 
also differently from the evolutionary game theoretic approach, where players 
are never allowed to perform deductive reasoning, this development should 
consist in representing the knowledge that players possess about the games 
                                                 
19 While analytically this kind of cognitive conflict may have to be formalized in terms of 
uncertainty over a (common) probability distribution on players’ types and related strategies, 
logically it is a straightforward extension of the repeatedly cited result that, with wealth effects, 
value maximization implies Pareto-efficiency but the reverse does not hold. A shared system 
of distributional beliefs, understood as referring to a situation where every player knows that 
every other player will accept a particular distribution of property rights and that every other 
player knows that every player will do the same, indeed implies Pareto-efficiency but, again, 
the reverse does not hold. Accordingly, the assumption about the sequential operation of the 
multi-level selection process may now be seen as a logical trick to point out the possibility that, 
as a consequence of non-separability, Pareto-efficient allocations that do not maximize total 
value end up by being (feasibly) contested, which is also the reason why the result should be 
that the  equilibrium just mentioned may exist only by chance but, if it does, it must be 
efficient and egalitarian.      22
they play as evolving into forms which may turn out to be critically dependent 





A much debated divide in theories of institutions is that between those that 
explain institutions in terms of the interaction between given individuals in a 
state of nature and those that explain individual behaviors in terms of given 
institutional structures. In the theory of the firm, this divide reflects the 
difference between the new-institutional approach, where the organizational 
structure of the firm is seen as the result of Pareto-efficient exchanges of 
property rights between given individuals, and the orthodox Marxist approach, 
where the organizational structure of the firm is seen as the result of the pre-
existing conflict between capitalists and workers. In the former case, unlike in 
the perfect competition model, the assumption of no wealth effects is crucial 
because otherwise there is no logical equivalence between Pareto-efficiency 
and value maximization. In the latter case, the assumption of collusion is 
crucial because otherwise, as a consequence of the dropping of the labor theory 
of value, individual capitalists would face an ordinary collective action 
problem.  
Consequently, while in the former case groups are treated like individuals 
so that there are no groups, in the latter case individuals are treated as groups 
so that there are no individuals. Moreover, for opposite reasons, in both cases 
group or class conflict is not an economic, but a political, phenomenon. 
In seeking to fill this gap, this paper has attempted to conceptualize the co-
evolutionary nature of the interaction between individuals and institutions by 
taking groups as the units of analysis in a multi-level competition framework 
assumed to operate sequentially both between and within groups. The other, 
related and even more critical assumption has been that surplus-value is almost 
always due to the collective undertaking of non additively separable human 
capital investments. Whether or not this notion of non additively separable 
human capital investment can be better understood as an updating of the labor 
theory of value, laying the basis for a re-submission of Marx’s critique of the 
notion of formal freedom, is an issue which has been repeatedly touched upon 
throughout the paper but, on the whole, is left to a future article. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Naturally, social sciences are subjective only in an ontological sense, being instead objective 
in the epistemic sense that their claims are observer-independent (otherwise no social science 
would be possible).    23
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